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*no*

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


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*yes*

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# 1. USSR MAY BE STIMULATING PRESSURE TO REOPEN DISARMAMENT ISSUE IN UN

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The Soviet delegation to the United Nations is apparently stimulating rumors that the disarmament question may be reopened in the General Assembly after the Christmas recess. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov recently stated that another move on disarmament could be made in two months. He had an appointment to discuss disarmament with General Assembly President Munro on 3 December.

Members of the Indian delegation have expressed the opinion that there is "great pressure" to conclude some agreement during the current session of the General Assembly.

Soviet stimulation of efforts to reopen the disarmament question in the UN--a move for which a two-thirds approval is needed--probably is aimed primarily at placing the West in the position of frustrating neutralist desires to overcome the Soviet boycott. An increasing number of UN members will probably be willing to accept Soviet demands for a representation on the Disarmament Commission "balanced" between the West on the one hand and neutralists and Communist states on the other.

The Soviet position, as expressed most recently by Khrushchev to the French ambassador in Moscow on 30 November, is that the USSR will not participate in further sessions of the Disarmament Commission until its membership is "balanced." Khrushchev has stated on several occasions that the Soviet Union is strong and can afford to wait out the disarmament question. Soviet officials have stated privately that the Soviet Union is ready to boycott further disarmament talks for a year in the belief that pressure would force the West to make concessions to Moscow.

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3. VIEWS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA ON  
REGIME POLICIES

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Members of the Soviet intelligentsia believe that a return to Stalinism is impossible in the USSR and that the regime will find it necessary gradually to permit greater freedom and democratization, [redacted]

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Further top-level changes are not expected as Khrushchev appears to be firmly in control and he is not generally thought of as "another Stalin." Malenkov is credited with post-Stalin liberalization and is still extremely popular with the technical intelligentsia. His removal was a far greater shock to this group than the downfall of Zhukov.

The intelligentsia is fully aware of the low standard of living as compared to that of the West, but the regime's emphasis on heavy industry is not questioned.

In academic fields, frank discussions occur among small groups of students and instructors. There is intense interest and curiosity in things foreign, and the official campaign to increase outside contacts has been received enthusiastically. This segment of the population is generally well informed concerning life in the West and frequently holds views not in accord with the official propaganda line. [redacted]

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## 5. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

The Indonesian government has taken unusual security precautions since the assassination attempt against President Sukarno to forestall other incidents. Guards have been increased at the homes of former Vice President Hatta, Prime Minister Djuanda, and army Chief of Staff Nasution, and government forces are continuing to round up suspects. Although the local military commander claims to have obtained confessions to the crime, he has refused to name the group or individuals responsible.

The Communists, however, have lost no time in accusing American and Dutch "imperialists" of complicity in the plot, and the American embassy reports "ominous signs" that this may become the official line.

The campaign of harassment against Dutch individuals and firms continues, and the severance of diplomatic relations is expected. The seizure of the offices of two large Dutch shipping companies by Communist labor union members is evidence of the Communists' intention to exploit the government's program of applying economic sanctions against the Netherlands in the dispute over Netherlands New Guinea. Although the government has denied authorization for the seizure, it is unlikely to take action against Communist moves which are in line with its own program and popular sentiment.

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